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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Blake Davis contends the prosecutor committed misconduct which rises to the level of
fundamental error by disparaging Mr. Davis, the defense argument, and the role of defense
counsel during closing arguments. As a result, this Court should vacate the relevant convictions
remand this case·for further proceedings.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Sometime around eleven p.m., officers went to Mr. Davis' house in an effort to find Kerri
Corson because they believed Mr. Davis had some information about her whereabouts.
(Tr., p.132.) 1 Though the fact was not introduced at trial, Mr. Davis was on probation at the
time. (See, e.g., Tr., p.11.) Officers saw a backpack in his room which roused their suspicions,
and upon searching it, they found a box which contained what they believed to be controlled
substances. (Tr., pp.135-37.) The State ultimately charged Mr. Davis with trafficking heroin
based on possessing more than seven grams, possession of oxycodone, misdemeanor possession
of buprenorphine and naloxone (suboxone), and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia.
(See R., pp.35-36.) Mr. Davis exercised his right to a trial.
During trial, one of the officers testified that, before they searched the backpack,
Mr. Davis had denied that he had any drugs, and he testified that Mr. Davis had, in fact, been
cooperative in the investigation by opening the box for: them. (Tr., pp.136-37, 149.) In closing
argument, defense counsel argued those action suggested that Mr. Davis did not know what was
in the box. (Tr., p.292.) In rebuttal, the prosecutor asserted: "Well surprise surprise, he denied

1

The transcripts in this case do not provide line numbers.
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having drugs. Why do dopers do what they do? Why do drug users do what they do? Who
knows." (Tr., p.305.) He returned to that theme a little later in his statements, arguing: "Again,
who knows what dopers are thinking, right?" (Tr., p.306.)
Additionally, during closing argument, defense counsel argued that the State had failed to
prove the scales were accurate, and therefore, there was reasonable doubt in regard to the amount
of heroin allegedly possessed. (Tr., pp.298-99.) The two witnesses who weighed the items in
question testified that other people were supposed to maintain the scales they used, but indicated
that they had not verified the calibration of either scale themselves. (Tr., pp.194, 227-28.) In
rebuttal, the prosecutor argued: "Typical. Lab scales, of course the lab scale must have been
off." (Tr., p.304.) He also argued: "It's ridiculous to think that the state has to bring in loads of
paperwork to show something for the scales about that." (Tr., p.304.) Mr. Davis did not object
to any of the prosecutor's rebuttal arguments. (See generally Tr.)
The jury ultimately hung on the trafficking charge, but found Mr. Davis guilty on the
other three charges. (Tr., pp.362-63; R., pp.129-30.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Davis
subsequently pied guilty to the trafficking charge. (Tr., pp.377-78.) The district court imposed a
unified sentence of twelve years, with ten years fixed, on the trafficking charge, a concurrent
seven-year sentence, with two years fixed, for the oxycodone charge, and concurrent sixty-day
sentences for the two misdemeanors. (R., pp.145-48.) Mr. Davis filed a notice of appeal timely
from the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.155-56.)

2

ISSUE
Whether the prosecutor committed misconduct rising to the level of fundamental error in his
closing arguments.
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ARGUMENT
The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct Rising To The Level Of Fundamental Error In His
Closing Arguments
Where there is no contemporaneous objection to prosecutorial misconduct, it will only be
reviewed for fundamental error.

State v. Peny, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010).

fundamental error, the appellant must demonstrate that:

To show

( 1) the error violates one of his

unwaived constitutional rights, (2) the error is clear from the record, and (3) the error prejudiced
him. Id. at 228. To show prejudice, the defendant must demonstrate that "there is a reasonable
possibility that the error affected the outcome of the trial." Id. at 226.
In regard to the first prong of the Peny standard, defendants have a constitutional right to
a fair trial and due process therein. U.S. CONST., amend. VI; U.S. CONST., amend. XIV. "Where
a prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other than the law as set forth in the jury
instructions and the evidence admitted during trial, including the reasonable inferences that may
be drawn from the evidence, this impacts a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair
trial." Peny, 150 Idaho at 227; accord United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 12 (1985). If a
prosecutor appeals to the emotions, passions, or prejudices of the jury, he has attempted to secure
a verdict on factors other than the evidence properly presented. See State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho
53, 64 (2011) (discussing the decision in State v. Babb, 125 Idaho 934, 942 (1994));
State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86 (Ct. App. 2007). Therefore, if the prosecutor commits that

sort of misconduct, the error would violate one of Mr. Davis' unwaived constitutional rights.
One way in which a prosecutor can improperly appeal to the jurors emotions is by
disparaging the defendant, defense counsel, or the defense argument. See, e.g., State v. Gross,
146 Idaho 15, 18 (Ct. App. 2008) ("Closing argument should not include . . . inflammatory
words employed in describing the defendant."); State v. Timmons, 145 Idaho 279, 290 (Ct. App.
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2007) (holding that closing arguments which "disparaged defense counsel's argument in this
case and the role of criminal defense attorneys in general" were improper); State v. Baruth, 107
Idaho 651, 657 (Ct. App. 1984) (explaining that "[a] prosecutor has every legitimate right to
point out weaknesses in a defendant's case, but this can be done in many ways without attacking
defendant's counsel"). In this case, the prosecutor's comments in his rebuttal closing arguments,
which are clear on the face of the record, did all three.
First, the prosecutor disparaged Mr. Davis by repeatedly using the slang term "doper" to
refer to Mr. Davis: "Well surprise surprise, he denied having drugs. Why do dopers do what
they do? Why do drug users do what they do? Who knows." "Again, who knows what dopers
are thinking, right?" (Tr., pp.305-06.)

Using that sort of disparaging label to refer to the

defendant in closing arguments is generally improper. See, e.g., State v. Kuhn, 139 Idaho 710,
716 (Ct. App. 2003) (indicating that calling the defendant a "liar" in closing arguments is
generally improper); compare Gross, 146 Idaho at 18 (explaining that repeatedly calling the
defendant a "liar" was "troubling" and would usually amount to misconduct, expect that the
prosecutor in that case was referencing the defendant's testimony, in which he admitted to lying
in connection with the case at bar). In this case, as opposed to Gross, the term "doper," is a
purely pejorative term; it has no justifiable alternative understanding. In the context of this case,
it was only meant to evoke an emotional reaction from the jurors against Mr. Davis' character,
which means the prosecutor's repeated use of that term was both troubling and improper.
Those statements also disparaged the defense argument. Mr. Davis was arguing that his
cooperation with the investigation suggested that he did not know what was in the box, and thus,
that there was reasonable doubt as to the knowledge element of the charged offenses. (See
Tr., p.292.)

Rather than argue about what the evidence showed in regard to Mr. Davis'
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knowledge, the prosecutor opted to repeatedly ~dicule the premise underlying Mr. Davis'
argument: "Well surprise surprise, he denied having drugs. Who knows why dopers do what
they do?"

"Who knows what dopers are thinking, right?"

(Tr., pp.305-06.)

When the

prosecutor resorts to distorting or ridiculing the defense argument in that manner, he is no longer
commenting on the evidence; rather, he is inviting the jurors emotionally react to it and reject it
based on that reaction, which is misconduct. See Ellington, 151 Idaho at 64; Phillips, 144 Idaho
at 86.
For example, in Timmons, the prosecutor's assertion that "the defendant's argument that
this is simply a case of going after somebody because their child doesn't dress well, doesn't have
money, I think that argument speaks for itself' was improper because it "disparaged defense
counsel's argument in this case." Timmons, 145 Idaho at 290. 2 Similarly, the prosecutor's
assertion that the defense argument would "open[] the doors to people saying I'm allowed to
commit crimes because of the mental illness I have" was improper because it "disparaged and
distorted his defense." State v. Beebe, 145 Idaho 570, 576 (Ct. App. 2007). The misconduct in
Beebe was not harmless. Id. On the other hand, calling the defense argument a "red herring"

and "smoke and mirrors," was not improper in State v. Norton because the context of those
statements indicated the prosecutor was just commenting on the evidence, inviting the jurors to

2

The prosecutor in Timmons made other comments which were improper because they
disparaged the role of defense counsel generally. See Timmons, 145 Idaho at 290. Additionally,
Timmons ultimately held that all the misconduct in that case did not rise to the level of
fundamental error, but, in doing so, it used a different analysis than the one Perry subsequently
held proper. Compare id. (holding the misconduct did not amount to fundamental error because
the error could have been cured had defense counsel objected and the district court ordered the
jury to disregard the improper comment), with Peny, 150 Idaho at 220, 227 (explaining that,
even though there is a judicial preference for contemporaneous objections so that such issues can
be resolved by the trial court, unobjected-to misconduct still constitutes fundamental error if the
misconduct amounted to a clear constitutional violation which affected the verdict that was
actually rendered).
6

focus only on the relevant aspects of the case. Se State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 188-89
(Ct. App. 2011).

The prosecutor's argument in this case was more like the comments in

Timmons and Beebe than Norton. They were not comments on the evidence or an invitation for

the jury to focus on the relevant facts. Rather, they cast the argument as absurd and seek to
evoke an emotional reaction in the jurors against the idea that Mr. Davis may not have known
what the box contained. Because they seek to get a verdict on emotions rather than the evidence,
they are misconduct.
The same is true of the prosecutor's argument that "[i]t's ridiculous to think that the state
has to bring in loads of paperwork to showing from the scales about that," and that such an
argument was "[t]ypical. Lab scales, of course the lab scale must have been off." (Tr., p.304.)
Like the "doper" comments, these comments about the scales invited the jurors to emotionally
reject the premise of the defense argument as absurd rather than on an evaluation of whether the
State had met its burden of proof on that element based on the testimony actually elicited during
trial. Such arguments amount to misconduct. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 163 Idaho 285, _

,

411 P.3d 1186, 1197 (Ct. App. 2018) (explaining that deriding the defense argument as
"ludicrous" would usually be improper, except that, in the context of that case, it was properly
used to highlight a weakness in the defense case), rev. denied.
Here, unlike in Williams, the prosecutor was not highlighting an analytical weakness in
the defense's argument because it was actually not ridiculous for the defense to challenge the
evidence presented regarding the calibration of the scales at the police department and the state
lab. Rather, as the Court of Appeals has pointed out, to properly lay foundation to show that a
scale's reading is accurate, the State must provide more than "an unexplained conclusory
statement that the scale has been 'calibrated' without any further admissible evidence of when,
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how, or by whom this was accomplished." See, e.g., State v. Barber, 157 Idaho 822 (Ct. App.
2014). As such, it was perfectly reasonable for defense counsel to argue that, because the two
witnesses who weighed the evidence only offered unexplained conclusory statements that
unidentified others were supposed to have calibrated the scales at some unidentified point in the
past, there was a reasonable doubt regarding the weight of the alleged heroin. Therefore, the
prosecutor's arguments about the scales, particularly its "ridiculous" statement, amounted to
nothing more than attempts to get the jury to disregard a valid defense argument based on
emotion rather than an evaluation of the evidence presented.
The prosecutor's arguments about the scales are also troubling because they disparage not
only the particular defense argument in this case, but the role of defense counsel generally.

Compare Timmons, 145 Idaho 290. The reason such arguments are problematic is that one of the
main roles defense counsel has in the adversary process is to hold the State to its fundamental
burden - to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656,
656 n.19 ( 1984) ("The right to the effective assistance of counsel is thus the right of the accused
to require the prosecution's case to survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing," and
thus, "even when no theory of defense is available, if the decision to stand trial has been made,
counsel must hold the prosecution to its heavy burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.").
When a prosecutor disparages the defense function, when it derides a defense attorney's
argument that the State has failed to carry its burden as absurd, especially when, as here, the
defense argument is patently not absurd, the prosecutor is effectively asking the jurors to hold
him to a lesser burden of proof than the law requires.
That is what the prosecutor's arguments about the scales did in this case. They sought to
evoke, though more subtly (and as a result, more nefariously), the same emotions in the jurors
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that the improper arguments in Timmons did. Those arguments invited the jurors to emotionally
reject a viable defense argument as a "ridiculous" display which was "[t]ypical" of defense
attorneys - "of course the lab scale must have been off." (See Tr., p.304.) The same is true of
the prosecutor's argument that, "Well surprise surprise, he denied having drugs." (Tr., p.305.)
Since those comments were aimed at getting the jury to decide the case based on their emotions
and prejudices rather than the evidence actually presented, they constitute misconduct.

See

Phillips, 144 Idaho at 86-87. As such, the first two prongs of the Peny standard are satisfied in
this case.
As to the third prong of the Peny standard, there is a reasonable possibility that the
prosecutor's misconduct affected the verdicts entered in this case, and therefore, prejudiced
Mr. Davis.

The improper "doper" statements, for example, specifically invited the jury to

emotionally reject the defense argument about the knowledge element of each charge in this
case, and the other disparaging comments reinforced that invitation to emotionally reject the
defense arguments.

Thus, the taint of the misconduct was omnipresent in the jury room,

threatening to alter the deliberations on each of the charges being deliberated.
Furthermore, the record is clear that several jurors harbored reasonable doubts regarding
the sufficiency of the evidence the State presented in this case. Notably, they asked several
questions about the evidence regarding the alleged weight of the heroin before ultimately
hanging on the trafficking charge. (Aug., pp.1-2; Tr., pp.362-63.) In a similar context, the Idaho
Supreme Court pointed out that, when a jury question revealed the jurors were concerned about a
particular issue, it could not say the error on that same point was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. State v. Thomas, 157 Idaho 916, ___, 342 P.3d 628, 631-32 (2015); compare Kulm, 139
Idaho at 716 (holding that, where the jury actually found the defendant innocent of one of the
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charges, the misconduct did not amount to fundamental error in regard to other charges under
deliberation). In this case, where it is clear that some of the jurors harbored doubts about some
of the State's evidence, there is a reasonable possibility that they had similar reasonable doubts
about the knowledge element which they disregarded, in part, because of the prosecutor's
improper disparaging arguments. See Thomas, 342 P .3d at 631-32. Since there is a reasonable
possibility that the prosecutor's misconduct affected the verdicts in this case, the third prong of
Peny is satisfied, and the prosecutor's misconduct amounts to fundamental error.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Davis respectfully requests that this Court vacate the relevant convictions in this case
and remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 5111 day of June, 2018.

~-·$ ~ ~

BR IAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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